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Abstract
Nowadays digital services, such as cloud computing and network access services, allow dy-
namic resource allocation and virtual resource isolation. This trend can create a new paradigm
of flexible pricing schemes. A simple pricing scheme is to allocate multiple isolated service classes
with differentiated prices, namely Paris Metro Pricing (PMP). The benefits of PMP are its sim-
plicity and applicability to a wide variety of general digital services, without considering specific
performance guarantees for different service classes. The central issue of our study is whether
PMP is economically viable, namely whether it will produce more profit for the service provider
and whether it will achieve more social welfare. Prior studies had only considered specific models
and arrived at conflicting conclusions. In this article, we identify unifying principles in a gen-
eral setting and derive general sufficient conditions that can guarantee the viability of PMP. We
further apply the results to analyze various examples of digital services.
Keywords: Internet Economics; Pricing; Service Classes; Cloud Computing Services
1 Introduction
The management of digital services, such as cloud computing, video streaming and gaming services,
and network access services in wireline and wireless networks, is increasingly dictated by economic
principles. Digital services possess several salient characteristics that allow more flexible resource
management and allocation mechanisms that pave the way for a variety of innovative pricing schemes.
First, there emerge new technologies for virtual resource isolation, by which resources can be
allocated conveniently (either dynamically or a priori) to create isolated service classes without
altering the underlying hardware infrastructure. Virtual resource isolation can be realized by a
variety of technologies. For example, computational virtualization can create virtual machines (VMs)
to abstract the underlying hardware resources from applications. Each VM can execute isolated
computing tasks without affecting others. On the other hand, software-defined radio has been utilized
at base stations to enable dynamic spectrum allocation for different standards in wireless access
networks, whereas multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) can assign different routing and queuing
operations for packets depending on specific applications. With virtual resource isolation, multiple
service classes can be conveniently established.
∗This paper appears in ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (ToIT), Special Issue on Pricing and Incentives
in Networks and Systems, Vol. 14, No. 12, Issue 2-3, pp12:1-12:21, Oct 2014. A preliminary version has been presented
at IEEE INFOCOM 2010 [2].
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Second, the availability of real-time measurement of services enables users to observe the per-
formance of other service classes. Users may make instantaneous decisions and adjustment to their
behavior according to the observed performance. In the presence of multiple service classes, users
who cannot tolerate the performance in the respective class may choose to switch between classes as
a consequence. Third, pricing models are evolving so as to be more flexible. The rise of on-demand
pricing models, such as pay-per-usage, allows users to readily opt out of a service.
Therefore, it is natural to consider pricing schemes for multiple service classes in digital services.
Nowadays, differentiated pricing with multiple service classes has been observed in practice. For
example, streaming and file sharing service providers offer premier and economic service classes that
can run simultaneously on the same cloud computing platform with isolated VMs and partitioned
bandwidth. In mobile wireless service, 3G and 4G can potentially share a spectrum allocated dy-
namically at base stations. A simple pricing scheme is to impose differentiated prices at different
service classes without fulfilling specific quality-of-service requirements and let users spontaneously
opt for the appropriate service classes according to their experienced performance. For example, a
premier service class charged at a higher price will attract fewer low-end users and therefore is able to
provide superior performance to the high-end users. This gives rise to so-called Paris Metro Pricing
(PMP), a simple multiclass flat-rate pricing scheme.
PMP is an attractive approach due to its simplicity. However, a more subtle question is whether
PMP is economically viable and specifically, whether we can improve the profit and social welfare
through a suitable pricing scheme on service classes with an appropriately allocated amount of re-
sources. Prior studies arrived at conflicting conclusions for this question. On the one hand, [4, 6]
found PMP to be viable, while on the other, based on a similar model, [10] numerically showed that
PMP may not be more viable than flat-rate pricing.
In this article, we observe unifying principles that depend on the nature of the externality of
the underlying service models. [4, 6] assumed one type of congestion function, whereas [10] assumed
another, hence reaching conflicting conclusions. We consider a general model that can capture a
wide variety of digital services and we provide general sufficient conditions for the viability of PMP
in terms of both social welfare as well as provider profit. This leads to the insights on why PMP is
or is not viable, understandable by common practitioners. We further apply our results to analyze
various examples of digital services.
Outline: Sec. 2 provides the background and related work. Sec. 3 formulates a general model
of PMP, and gives several examples of digital services that it captures. Sec. 4 gives an overview
of our analytic results considering monopoly. We then extend our study to duopoly, supported by
numerical studies in Sec. 5.
2 Background and Related Work
PMP was first proposed by Odlyzko [8] as a simple pricing model for the Internet-differentiated
services and can better satisfy users with different aversion to effects of congestion as divided by
different service classes. The scheme is inspired by the convention used by Paris metro at one time1:
The first- and second-class cars are charged with different prices, although physically the cars are
the same (in terms of the number and quality of the seats). Since fewer people would pay more for
the first-class fare, it is also less congested. Thus, users more concerned about getting a seat can
opt for first class, and more cost conscious users can opt for second. Note that, in each class, the
user is still paying a flat rate. PMP has a self-stabilizing property, namely that if the performance of
1This scheme is actually adopted rather widely in other transportation systems in the world, including the Mass
-Transit Railway in Hong Kong.
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first class deteriorates, some users will switch to second class, thus increasing the quality differential
between the classes.
In general, the main types of pricing schemes adopted in practice include2: (1) flat-rate pricing,
that is, to charge a one-off payment for every user, regardless her usage. (2) usage-based pricing, that
is, to charge according to the amount and pattern of usage of each individual user. In this broad
classification, we also include congestion pricing as a form of usage-based pricing. In the presence of
multiple service classes, one can apply flat-rate or usage-based pricing to each of the service classes.
Congestion pricing, levied only when resource demand exceeds supply, can be argued as economically
and theoretically the most optimal strategy for allocating congested resources. In practice, however
users strongly prefer flat-rate pricing [7]3.
Since PMP relies on the spontaneous economics adjustment of users, the outcome may not align
with the goals of mechanism designers. There have been studies [4–6, 10, 11, 13] in the literature
to address the viability of PMP that consider the following two major criteria: (1) Social welfare,
the total utility of users, taking into account the congestion. (2) Provider profit, the total payment
collected by the service providers from different service classes.
Based on a multiproduct economics model in [1, 3], [4] formulates a model of PMP, considering
the massive number of infinitesimal users and analyzes the viability of PMP for social welfare and
provider profit. However, [4] consider only a specific model (that we call utilization-sensitive service)
and assume no user will opt out4. Next, [5] consider a less specified model but focusing on provider
profit and still under the assumption of no user opt-out and homogeneous service classes (where the
resources allocated to each class are identical).
On the other hand, [6,11] consider utilization-sensitive service with user opt-out, but only study
provider profit. Meanwhile, [10] numerically studies PMP under a different model (which we call
latency-sensitive service) for only provider profit. In the prior work of utilization-sensitive service
( [4,6,11]), it is reported that PMP is viable for a single monopoly provider. Nonetheless, [10] reports
that PMP is not viable in latency-sensitive service for a monopoly provider based on only numerical
analysis. We observe that different models can give contradictory results. But there are yet any
studies to provide a complete picture considering a general model, beyond the specific examples of
utilization- and latency-sensitive services.
To provide a unifying picture, we first analytically study the case of single monopoly provider.
We then extend to a duopoly setting for different models. In contrast to the observation in [4],
we find that PMP is also viable for duopoly for a certain model of congestion with user opt-out.
Our analysis is supported by extensive numerical study. Our study follows the popular model of
infinitesimal users, as in the prior work ( [4–6,10,11]). We note that a different model of PMP with
finitely many users has been studied in [13] showing that in a specific setting of user utility function
wherein a single service class is strictly better than multiple service classes for a monopoly provider.
Their conclusion agrees with [10] and generally with ours, albeit by a different model with finitely
many users.
2One can also apply a static (time-invariant) pricing strategy as well as a dynamic pricing strategy (that is contingent
on the history) to these pricing schemes. Also, the pricing strategy may be application-specific [12].
3 For example, while the Internet service provider (ISP) settlements on aggregate transited traffic are typically
based on usage-based pricing, ISPs charge users using flat-rate pricing for its simplicity. This observation also applies
to other digital services. While flat-rate pricing is simple, it is insufficient to control the desirable performance to
satisfy users’ utility. Users are intolerant of inferior performance are forced to opt out. On the other hand, usage-based
pricing enables more sophisticated control of performance, but incurs a higher implementation cost because of its more
intrusive monitoring and policing on the usage pattern.
4Allowing user opt-out leads to a variable number of users in the system that is equivalent to elastic demand,
whereas inelastic demand is equivalent to a constant fixed number of users in the system.
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3 Model and Notations
This section presents a model for PMP based on different possible forms of negative externality,
generalizing the models from [4–6, 10, 11], and defines the notations of equilibrium (in which users
settle their selections of service classes) and social welfare and provider profit.
Regardless of the technologies of resource isolation in digital services, it is vital to understand
the economical viability of such a service model. Without specifying the implementation details of
resource isolation, we assume that resources can be conveniently split or merged among different
service classes.
3.1 Utility and Services Classes
Suppose that there are m service classes. Similar to many economic studies [4, 6, 11], we assume
there are a large number of users. This can be approximated by a continuum model of infinitesimal
users such that the type of each infinitesimal user is characterized by a one-dimensional valuation
of a positive real parameter θ. The consideration of infinitesimal user is widely used in economics
literature that concerns massive numbers of users, such as in digital services. One expects that the
more detailed model of finitely many users will approach the simpler one of infinitesimal users when
the number of users becomes large.
When a user of type θ (in short, we call user θ) uses service class i ∈ {1, ...,m}, we assume that
its utility is given by:
Uθ(i) , V − pi − θ ·K(Qi, Ci) (1)
These parameters are explained as follows.
1. V is the maximum utility of accessing the service.
2. pi is the one-off payment charged per user when accessing the i-th service class. Without loss
of generality, we assume V ≥ p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pm ≥ 0.
3. Ci is the proportion of total capacity of the i-th service class, such that
∑m
i=1Ci = 1.
4. Qi is the volume of users of accessing the i-th service class.
5. K is a congestion function that is increasing in Qi, but is decreasing in Ci, to be explained in
the next section.
Therefore, user θ will have two options either: (1) to select the i-th service class to join that gives
the highest utility as
i = arg maxj∈{1,...,m}Uθ(j), (2)
or (2) to opt out of all service classes because joining any service class will result in a negative utility,
that is, Uθ(i) < 0 for all i ∈ {1, ...,m}.
An immediate implication of utility function Uθ(i) (Eqn. (1)) is that, the larger the value of θ
means the higher the valuation on the negative externality, as compared with the price of each service
class. Hence, users with the larger value of θ will be more likely to opt out of the service because of
negative utility Uθ(i) < 0 for all i.
Remark: Utility function can be alternately defined as U˜θ(i) , θ·K˜(Qi, Ci)−pi, where K˜(Qi, Ci)
represents a satisfaction function capturing the inverse effect of a congestion function5. We consider
utility function as Eqn. (1) in this article, because there are special cases used in the prior work in
5In this case, users with smaller value of θ will be likely to opt out of the service because of negative utility.
Previously, U˜θ(i) was used in the literature of economics [1, 3].
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Table 1: Examples of Metrics of Negative Externality for Digital Services
Utilization Latency Loss Probability Outage Probability
Kutl(Q,C) , QC Klat(Q,C) ,
1
C−Q Klos(Q,C) , (
Q
C )
k 1−QC
1−(Q
C
)k+1
Kout(Q,C) , ( QC )C
networking research community [4–6, 10, 11]. Nonetheless, the results derived in this article can be
easily adapted and similarly applied to U˜θ(i). Also, we remark that [1,3] consider only homogeneous
service classes (i.e., Ci is the same in all m service classes). We relax this constraint to include
heterogeneous service classes of different Ci’s.
3.2 Congestion Functions of Digital Service Models
Under PMP, users first observe the performance of different service classes and then opt for the
appropriate classes. The performance of digital services is characterized by negative externality,
where, the greater number of users accessing a certain service, the less favorable performance the
users can perceive. The degree of negative externality also depends on the resource allocated to the
service. Hence, negative externality can be characterized by: (1) the volume of users accessing the
service, and (2) the amount of allocated resource. These two quantities form the basis of negative
externality.
In this article, we employ a congestion function K(Q,C) to capture the negative externality,
where C represents the numerical amount of resource and where Q represents the volume of users
accessing the service. We normalize Q, such that 0 ≤ Q ≤ C. Table 1 provides several examples of
K(Q,C) that can model various metrics of negative externality in common digital services.
1. Utilization: This is measured by the portion of capacity per each unit of load, given by
Kutl(Q,C) , QC . Utilization is a useful metric for computation, bandwidth, and memory shar-
ing services, such as cloud computing and network access services. Kutl(Q,C) was considered
in prior work [4].
2. Latency: This is conveniently captured by a simple M/M/1 queue. Assuming the arrival
rate is of Q units, and the service rate is of C units, then the total expected waiting time
(i.e., queuing time plus service time) is Klat(Q,C) , 1C−Q . Klat(Q,C) was considered in prior
work [10]. Latency is a useful metric for queuing sensitive services such as streaming or network
routing services. We also consider more general M/G/1 queue in the later section.
3. Loss Probability: We also consider M/M/1/k queue to model queuing-based digital services.
An important metric is whether a request will be dropped when all k servers are occupied.
In the M/M/1/k model, the probability that k servers are occupied is given by Klos(Q,C) ,
(QC )
k 1−QC
1−(Q
C
)k+1
.
4. Outage Probability: To model the reliability of digital services, we consider a small probability
that a server will fail. A natural setting of failure probability is proportional to the utilization
Q
C . If there are C servers, then the probability that all servers will fail is given by Kout(Q,C) ,
( QC )
C .
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Observations: Different congestion functions lead to different results. As a clear illustration,
we consider a simple scenario of resource partitioning into two identical service classes charged at an
identical price such that each class is allocated with half the original resource. Because of identical
resource and price, it is likely the usage will be split equally between the two identical service classes.
Hence, we define the resource and usage for each service class by C1 = C2 =
C
2 and Q1 = Q2 =
Q
2 ,
where the subscript indicates the first or second class, and C,Q are the resource and usage of the
original nonsplit service class. For utilization-sensitive service, the congestion functions after service
partitioning become
Kutl(Q1, C1) = Kutl(Q2, C2) =
Q
C
= Kutl(Q,C) (3)
In other words, the users will not perceive any difference in terms of negative externality. On the
other hand, for latency-sensitive service, the congestion functions after service partitioning become
Klat(Q1, C1) = Klat(Q2, C2) =
2
C −Q > Klat(Q,C) (4)
In this case, the users actually perceive a degradation of service after service partitioning! Therefore,
we may conclude that the provision of multiple service classes provided by resource partitioning is
not viable for latency-sensitive service, because of the decrease of total welfare of users and also
the decrease of provider profit, as some users may opt out of the service. The preceding simple
discussion, however, has not taken into consideration that different service classes may have varying
prices. A more complete study requires a model including payment as a part of the user utility and a
clear description of the users’ decision process for switching between service classes and opting out.
This will be completed in the following sections.
3.3 Equilibrium, Social Welfare and Provider Profit
In this article, we will analyze the viability of PMP at equilibrium. An equilibrium will be attained
when no user switches from his selection. To formulate equilibrium, we first note that K(Qi, Ci) is
fixed for each i-th service class at equilibrium, thus also the price pi. Hence, the utility function Uθ(i)
(Eqn. (1)) becomes a linear function of θ with −K(Qi, Ci) as the slope and V −pi as the y-intercept.
For the case m = 2, we plot the utility Uθ(i) against θ in Fig. 1 for illustration.
Given a vector of differentiated prices, denoted by p = (pi)
m
i=1, for the m service classes, there
exists a set of cut-off users, denoted by θ = (θi)
m
i=1, such that, for i = 2, ..,m, each cut-off user θi is
indifferent to joining the (i−1)-th service class or the i-th service class (i.e., Uθi(i−1) = Uθi(i)), and
cut-off user θ1 is indifferent to joining the first service class or opting out of these m service classes.
Hence, an equilibrium can be characterized by the tuple (p,θ).
Let Q0 , 1 −
∑m
i=1(Qi) be the volume of users who opt out of these m service classes. The
users are parameterized by θ, which is described by a cumulative distribution function F (θ) (and its
probability density function denoted by f(θ)). A special case is that F (θ) is a uniform distribution.
Definition 3.1. (Equilibrium) The tuple (p,θ) defines an equilibrium, if the following constraints
are satisfied:
(c.1): θ1 > θ2 > · · · > θm > θm+1 = 0,
(c.2): K(Qi, Ci) ≤ K(Qi+1, Ci+1) for i 6= m, where
Qi ,
{
F (θm) if i = m
F (θi)− F (θi+1) if 1 ≤ i < m (5)
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Q1Q2
θ1θ2
V−p1
V−p2
Uθ
θ
K(Q2,C2)
K(Q1,C1)
0
Uθ (1)
Uθ (2)
Figure 1: An illustration of equilibrium. We plot the utility Uθ(i) against θ for the case m = 2. We
assume F (θ) = θ is a uniform distribution.
(c.3):
pi−1 − pi= θi ·
(
K(Qi, Ci)−K(Qi−1, Ci−1)
)
if 1 < i ≤ m
p1= V − θ1 ·K(Q1, C1) otherwise (6)
In order words, (c.1) requires the set of cut-off users (θi)
m+1
i=1 to have a strict order of valuations
on negative externality. User θm+1 = 0 is the least-valuation user who always accepts the lowest-
priced service class (i.e., the m-th service class). (c.2) follows from V ≥ p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pm ≥ 0 and the
definition of utility function (Eqn. (1)). Lastly, (c.3) characterizes the prices of service classes based
on the fact that each cut-off user θi is indifferent to joining the (i− 1) and i-th service classes (i.e.,
Uθi(i− 1) = Uθi(i)). These conditions are depicted in Fig. 1.
Note that it is possible that pi = pi−1 (i.e., K(Qi, Ci) = K(Qi−1, Ci−1)) for some i. It is easy
to see that an equilibrium always exists given either p or θ. Namely, there is a one-to-one mapping
between p and θ at equilibrium (see [1] for a rigorous proof).
To facilitate the analysis, we also assume that F (θ) is a well-formed distribution, such that
f(θ) > 0 for θ ∈ [0, θ¯] ⊆ [0, 1] for constant θ¯, ands f(θ) = 0 otherwise. This assumption prevents
discontinuity of the marginal change of p with respect to the marginal change of θ at equilibrium.
Finally, we define the social welfare as the total utility of all users excluding the payment and
define the monopoly provider profit as the total payment collected from the users. Suppose (p,θ) is
an equilibrium. Let the social welfare be
S(p) ,
m∑
i=1
∫ θi
θi+1
(
V − θ ·K(Qi, Ci)
)
· f(θ)dθ (7)
Note that in Eqn. (7), θ is a function of p at equilibrium. Let the monopoly provider profit be
pi(p) ,
m∑
i=1
pi ·Qi (8)
3.4 Numerical Study
Before presenting our analytical results, this section provides some illustrations of the consequences
of PMP in terms of social welfare and provider profit at equilibrium by means of numerical studies.
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We consider four specific examples, namely utilization-, latency-, loss- and outage-sensitive services.
Specifically, we compare: (1) the case of one single service class (C = 1), and (2) the case of two
service classes (C1 = 0.3, C2 = 0.7). In the numerical example, we let the probability distribution
F (θ) be a uniform distribution and the maximum utility be V = 2.
We compare the maximum social welfare and provider profit that can be achieved between one
single service class and two service classes. For two service classes, we let p2 = a ·p1, where a ∈ [0, 1].
When a = 1, it is equivalent to identical pricing at two service classes. We numerically evaluated
the following four quantities for different service models.
max
0≤p≤V
pi(p), max
0≤p1≤V
pi(p1, a · p1), max
0≤p≤V
S(p), max
0≤p1≤V
S(p1, a · p1) (9)
Figs. 2-5 show the respective numerical values of maximum social welfare and provider profit at
given values of a, for utilization-, latency-, loss- and outage-sensitive services. Note that, when there
is one service class, the maximum social welfare and provider profit are constant values with respect
to a.
Observations: We obtain the following observations from Figs. 2-9 that motivate our later
results.
1. For utilization- and loss-sensitive services, the social welfare and provider profit for one service
class and two service classes under identical pricing (i.e., a = 1) are equivalent. But for
latency- and outage-sensitive service, there is a gap between the cases, that is, one service
class yields better social welfare and profit for latency-sensitive service, whereas it is worse for
outage-sensitive service.
2. For utilization-, loss- and outage-sensitive services, the service provider can make more profit
from PMP under a certain setting of differentiated pricing (see Figs 3, 7, 9); but for latency-
sensitive service, PMP (whether under differentiated pricing or identical pricing) is not viable
from the provider profit’s point of view (see Fig 5). These are exactly the contradictory
conclusions reached by [6] and [10], respectively. We observe the same conclusions for social
welfare.
3. We remark that, in general, for latency-sensitive service with two service classes, identical
pricing may or may not provide higher social welfare or profit than differentiated pricing.
However, for utilization-, loss- and outage-sensitive services with two service classes, it is always
possible that differentiated pricing can provide higher social welfare and profit than identical
pricing.
The numerical results just given motivate the goal for this study, namely how to settle the question
of when PMP can be guaranteed to yield higher profits and achieve more social welfare. We answer
this question by deriving conditions on a general class of congestion functions, beyond just the cases
of utilization- and latency-sensitive services.
Tactically, we study this problem in two steps by asking the following questions.
1. How do we ensure the viability of partitioning a service class into multiple service classes under
identical pricing?
2. How do we ensure the viability of differentiated pricing of multiple service classes as compared
with identical pricing?
Resolving these two questions can lead to a characterization of the viability of PMP. Our answers to
these questions are elaborated in Sec. 4.
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Figure 2: Maximum social welfare for
utilization-sensitive service, where p2 = a · p1.
Figure 3: Maximum provider profit for
utilization-sensitive service, where p2 = a · p1.
Figure 4: Maximum social welfare for latency-
sensitive service, where p2 = a · p1.
Figure 5: Maximum provider profit for latency-
sensitive service, where p2 = a · p1.
Figure 6: Maximum social welfare for loss-
sensitive service, where p2 = a · p1.
Figure 7: Maximum provider profit for loss-
sensitive service, where p2 = a · p1.
Figure 8: Maximum social welfare for outage-
sensitive service, where p2 = a · p1.
Figure 9: Maximum provider profit for outage-
sensitive service, where p2 = a · p1.
4 Monopoly Case
The viability of PMP ultimately depends on the basic properties of the congestion function. In
this section, we provide a general analytical study by identifying some key properties of congestion
functions associated with the viability of PMP considering monopoly.
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4.1 Viability of Service Partitioning
We first consider identical pricing and provide insights for the viability of service partitioning, wherein
one single service class is partitioned into two service classes, both of which are priced the same as
the original service class and, each service class is allocated a portion of the capacity of the original
service class. Initially, there is one single service class. Let p and C be the price and capacity of
the original single service class. Let θ˜ be the cut-off user at equilibrium (who is indifferent to either
opting-out or joining the service) and the total usage be Q˜ , F (θ˜). Then, the social welfare becomes
S(p) ,
∫ θ˜
0
(
V − θ ·K(Q˜, C)
)
· f(θ)dθ (10)
and the respective provider profit becomes
pi(p) , pQ˜ (11)
Next, we consider resource partitioning into two service classes. Let C1 and C2 be the respective
capacity of each service class, where C1+C2 = C. Let θ1 and θ2 be the cut-off users at the equilibrium
of each service class, and the respective usage be Q1 , F (θ1) − F (θ2) and Q2 , F (θ2). Because of
an identical pricing of each service class at p, the social welfare for the partitioned service classes is6:
S(p, p) ,
∫ θ2
0
(
V − θ ·K(Q2, C2)
)
· f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ1
θ2
(
V − θ ·K(Q1, C1)
)
· f(θ)dθ (12)
while the respective provider profit is7:
pi(p, p) , p(Q1 +Q2) (13)
We next provide a general sufficient condition on K(Q,C) for the viability of service partitioning.
Theorem 4.1. For all 0 ≤ α < 1 we have the following.
1. (Partition-preferred congestion function): If K(Q,C) ≥ K(αQ,αC),
S(p, p) ≥ S(p) and pi(p, p) ≥ pi(p) (14)
2. (Multiplexing-preferred congestion function): If K(Q,C) ≤ K(αQ,αC),
S(p, p) ≤ S(p) and pi(p, p) ≤ pi(p) (15)
The proofs are all in the Appendix unless otherwise stated.
Theorem 4.1 classifies two types of congestion functions. Intuitively, the congestion function
favoring service partitioning is one that sees decreased congestion externality as we scale down the
usage and capacity. Alternatively, the congestion function that favors multiplexing (service merging)
is one that sees decreased congestion externality as we scale up the usage and capacity. Note that a
congestion function K(Q,C) is given by definition increasing in usage Q, but decreasing in capacity
C. When we scale up both usage and capacity, one or the other of these factors is more dominating,
giving rise to the two classes of congestion functions.
We next apply Theorem 4.1 to several specific examples.
6In trying to reduce notations, we are going to slightly abuse our use of them here. The social welfare for the case
of a single class service with one price p, and the case of multiple service classes with price p will both be denoted by
a function S(.), with a different number of price parameters as appropriate.
7Again, the same abuse of notation is applied to the profit function.
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Example 1. 1. Utilization-sensitive service: Kutl(Q,C) is indifferent to partitioning or multi-
plexing.
Kutl(Q,C) =
Q
C
=
αQ
αC
= Kcs(αQ,αC) (16)
2. Latency-sensitive service: Klat(Q,C) prefers multiplexing to partitioning.
Klat(Q,C) =
1
C −Q <
1
α(C −Q) = Klat(αQ,αC) (17)
Further, motivated by Pollaczek-Khinchine formula for M/G/1 queue, we also consider general
latency as
Kglat(Q,C) =
Q(1 + δ2S)
2C(C −Q) +
1
C
, (18)
where δ2S is the coefficient of variation of service time, by convention. Similarly, Kglat(Q,C)
prefers multiplexing to partitioning.
Kglat(Q,C) <
1
α
Kglat(Q,C) = Kglat(αQ,αC) (19)
3. Loss-sensitive service: Similar to Kutl(Q,C), Klos(Q,C) is indifferent to partitioning or multi-
plexing.
4. Outage-sensitive service: Kout(Q,C) prefers partitioning to multiplexing:
Kout(Q,C) = (
αQ
αC
)C > (
αQ
αC
)αC = Kout(αQ,αC) (20)
By means of Theorem 4.1, we conclude that service partitioning is viable for utilization-, loss- and
outage-sensitive services. This has been validated in Sec. 3.4. Note that Theorem 4.1 is sufficiently
general and can be applied to diverse types of congestion functions.
The following corollary extends Theorem 4.1 from two classes to multiple classes.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose 0 ≤ α < 1, and p = (pi = p)mi=1, then the following hold.
1. (Partition-preferred congestion function):
If K(Q,C) ≥ K(αQ,αC) for all α,
S(p) ≥ S(p) and pi(p) ≥ pi(p) (21)
2. (Multiplexing-preferred congestion function):
If K(Q,C) ≤ K(αQ,αC) for all α,
S(p) ≤ S(p) and pi(p) ≤ pi(p) (22)
Proof. This is straightforward to prove by induction through proving m service classes is true when
supposing (m− 1) service classes is true.
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4.2 Viability of Differentiated Pricing
Although Sec. 4.1 provides the sufficient condition for service partitioning under identical pricing,
it does not cover the case of differentiated pricing. In particular, PMP is not perceivable by users
under identical pricing. To complete the picture, in this section we compare differentiated pricing
and identical pricing. We will rely on the following property of congestion functions.
Definition 4.3. (Monotone Preference to Service Classes) Given a fixed set {Ci : i = 1, ...,m}, the
set of congestion functions {K(Qi, Ci) : i = 1, ...,m} are subject to:
1. each K(Qi, Ci) must be strictly increasing and differentiable in Qi, hence, the partial derivative
of K(Qi, Ci) at Qi: k(Qi, Ci) , ∂K(Q,C)∂Q |Q=Qi,C=Ci exists and is positive;
2. suppose C1 < C2 < · · · < Cm, then either one of the following two cases must be true:
(m.1) Qi > Qj implying k(Qi, Ci) > k(Qj , Cj) for any distinct pair i 6= j; or
(m.2) Qi > Qj implying k(Qi, Ci) < k(Qj , Cj) for any distinct pair i 6= j.
The first condition in Definition 4.3 ensures the smoothness of congestion functions, whereas the
second condition requires a monotone order on the derivatives of the m service classes. Intuitively,
a monotone order of the derivatives (i.e., (m.1) or (m.2)) reflects a monotone order of sensitivity
of negative externality among the service classes. Consequently, such a monotone preference is an
indication that, once a user joins the second class, any marginal change to usage in each service class
will only shift the user’s selection to either the first class or third class (if available). This precludes
the switching among service classes that is out of a linear order.
Note that homogeneous service classes with the same convex congestion function (i.e., Ci =
Cj) obviously satisfy Definition 4.3. Here, we also allow distinct Ci to capture the heterogeneous
capacities among different service classes. The provider profit for homogeneous service classes had
been studied in [1]. Here we generalize the result to consider heterogeneous service classes and social
welfare. We next apply Definition 4.3 to some examples.
Example 2. 1. Utilization-sensitive service: Suppose C1 < C2 < · · · < Cm, Kutl(Q,C) satisfies
monotone preference to service classes. Then
kutl(Qi, Ci) =
∂Kutl(Q,C)
∂Q
|Q=Qi,C=Ci =
1
Ci
(23)
⇒ kutl(Q1, C1) > kutl(Q2, C2) > · · · > kutl(Qm, Cm) for all Q1, Q2, ..., Qm. (24)
2. Latency-sensitive service: However, Klat(Q,C) does not always satisfy monotone preference to
service classes because
klat(Qi, Ci) =
∂Klat(Q,C)
∂Q
|Q=Qi,C=Ci =
1
(Ci −Qi)2 (25)
Note that 1
(Ci−Qi)2 is not a monotone function in Ci or Qi. For instance, when C1 = 0.3, C2 =
0.7, Q1 = 0.2, Q2 = 0.5, then
1
(C1−Q1)2 >
1
(C2−Q2)2 However, when Q1 = 0.05, Q2 = 0.5, then
1
(C1−Q1)2 <
1
(C2−Q2)2 .
3. Loss-sensitive service: Similar to Kutl(Q,C), Klos(Q,C) satisfies monotone preference to ser-
vice classes.
4. Outage-sensitive service: One also can show that Kout(Q,C) satisfies monotone preference to
service classes.
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In the following, we compare the maximum social welfare gained by identical pricing and differen-
tiated pricing, given a monotone preference to service classes. Hence, we conclude that differentiated
pricing is viable for utilization-, loss- and outage-sensitive services. This has been validated in
Sec. 3.4.
Theorem 4.4. Given two service classes that satisfy monotone preference (Definition 4.3), the social
welfare obtained through identical pricing at p is strictly inferior to differentiated pricing for some
p1 6= p2:
S(p1, p2) > S(p, p) (26)
The proof relies on the notion of total derivative dS(p1, p2), which can be found in the Appendix
(Sec. 7.2). One might not be surprised to see that the differentiated pricing (p1 6= p2) could be better
than identical pricing (p1 = p2), but what is remarkable is the strict superiority of differentiated
pricing. In Sec. 3.4, we have validated this result for utilization-sensitive service. Note that for a
congestion function that does not satisfy monotone preference, the maximum social welfare gained by
identical pricing may or may not be higher than that of differentiated pricing. This can be observed
in latency-sensitive service. Theorem 4.4 can be extended to the case of m service classes as follows.
Hence, for utilization-sensitive service, it is advantageous to offer as many service classes as possible,
in terms of an increase of social welfare.
Corollary 4.5. Given m service classes that satisfy monotone preference (Definition 4.3), let p ,
(pi = p)
m
i=1, then there exists p
′ , (p′i)mi=1, such that p′i 6= p′j for all distinct i, j ∈ {1, ...,m},
S(p′) > S(p) (27)
We can also prove the same results for provider profit.
Theorem 4.6. Given two service classes that satisfy monotone preference (Definition 4.3), the
provider profit of identical pricing at p is strictly inferior to that of differentiated pricing for some
p1 6= p2:
pi(p1, p2) > pi(p, p) (28)
Corollary 4.7. Given m service classes that satisfy monotone preference (Definition 4.3), let p ,
(pi = p)
m
i=1, then there exists p
′ , (p′i)mi=1, such that p′i 6= p′j for some distinct i, j ∈ {1, ...,m},
pi(p′) > pi(p) (29)
Corollary 4.7 is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.6, but is weaker than Corollary 4.5,
since provider profit is more difficult to analyze than social welfare.
Ramification: We arrive at the point where we can provide a more complete answer to our
original question on the viability of PMP. Combining Theorems 4.1-4.6, we have a sufficient condition
to guarantee PMP to be viable in the sense of both provider profit as well as social welfare. This also
explains not only why PMP is viable for utilization-, loss- and outage-sensitive services, but also for
latency-sensitive services is not always viable. Theorems 4.1-4.6 are sufficiently general so that they
can also be applied to general digital services.
5 Duopoly Case
The study involving multiple competitive providers is more challenging. A plausible outcome is that
the providers settle at a Nash equilibrium at which unilateral change in pricing or capacity allocation
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will induce an inferior profit. Previously, [4] studied the properties of Nash equilibrium of PMP in
the presence of two competitive providers and derived a closed-form solution of Nash equilibrium
for the simple setting of utilization services of the same capacity and disallowing user opt-out. They
reported that PMP is not viable in the setting of two competitive providers as compared to the case
of simply a single service class offered by each provider.
However, in a more general model with user opt-out as studied in this article, the viability of
PMP is a consequence of more subtle properties of the congestion function. In fact, we find PMP
viable in several settings of partition-preferred congestion functions.
In this section, we first derive necessary conditions for Nash equilibrium for two competitive
providers. We restrict our analysis to the setting wherein one provider (I) offers a single unparti-
tioned service class, whereas another provider (II) can flexibly partition its service classes and offer
differentiated pricing. The necessary conditions are then applied to the numerical study of several
specific congestion functions, from which we compare the viability of PMP.
5.1 Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
We define the profit of provider I as piI , pIQI where pI is the price offered for its single service class
and QI is the amount of users accessing it. From Eqn. (5), QI = Qi if p
I is the i-th highest price
among all the service classes offered.
Provider II, by contrast, has an option to offer two service classes (offering pII1 ≥ pII2 at capacity
C II1 and C
II
2 respectively), or a single service class (offering p
II at C II = C II1 + C
II
2 ). Hence
piII ,
{
pII1Q
II
1 + p
II
2Q
II
2 for two service classes
pIIQII for one service class
(30)
where QII1 , Q
II
2 , Q
II are the amount of users accessing the respective service classes.
The necessary condition for Nash equilibrium is that derivative dpi
I
dpI
= 0, at given pII1 , p
II
2 , C
II
1 , C
II
2
(or pII, C II). The respective derivatives are listed for all five cases in Table 2 in the Appendix. In the
table, we let Ki = K(Qi, Ci) and ki =
∂K(Q,C)
∂Q |Q=Qi,C=Ci , where Qi is the total amount of users and
Ci is the capacity of i-th service class.
Based on the derivatives, we then numerically evaluate pI such that dpi
I
dpI
= 0 at given C I, pII1 , p
II
2 , C
II
1 , C
II
2
(or pII, C II). Furthermore, we corroborate the existence of Nash equilibrium at the corresponding
(pI, C I, pII1 , p
II
2 , C
II
1 , C
II
2 ) and (p
I, C I, pII, C II) by examining whether piI and piII are local maxima in the
corresponding neighborhood region.
5.2 Numerical Study and Observations
Using the preceding results, we particularly study the viability of PMP for utilization-sensitive
service. We generalize the congestion function by incorporating default consumption. Define a
modified congestion function as
Kutl.d(Q,C) ,
Q− ε
C
(31)
where ε ≤ Q is a certain consumption incurred whenever the service class is accessed. This is useful
to model the scenario wherein certain overhead or default consumption is imposed in the service.
It is straightforward to show that congestion function Kutl.d(Q,C) strictly prefers service parti-
tioning to multiplexing (when ε > 0), and satisfies monotone preferences to service classes.
Figs. 10-13 show the profit of each provider at various given values of pI, and the corresponding
best response from provider II on its pricing and capacity so as to maximize its profit piII.
Observations: We obtain the following key observations from Figs. 10-13:
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1. PMP is viable in several settings of utilization service with and without default consumption.
Because provider II always has a higher profit when it partitions its service classes (i.e., lines
of “2 vs 1” in the figures), so is the profit of provider I.
2. Multiplexing-preferred congestion functions (Kutl.d(Q,C)) produce higher viability for PMP.
3. When more capacity is given to provider II, the benefit of PMP is more prominent (see the
larger gap between profits of provider I and provider II in Fig. 13).
We note that although general analytical results are harder for the competitive case, our numerical
results agree with the observations in other multiplexing-preferred congestion functions.
Figure 10: Utilization-sensitive service
(Kutl(Q,C), V = 2, C
I = C II = 1).
Figure 11: Utilization-sensitive service with de-
fault consumption (Kutl.d(Q,C), V = 2, C
I =
C II = 1, ε = 0.1).
Figure 12: Utilization-sensitive service with de-
fault consumption (Kutl.d(Q,C), V = 2, C
I =
C II = 1, ε = 0.2).
Figure 13: Utilization-sensitive service
(Kutl(Q,C), V = 3, C
I, C II = 2).
6 Conclusion and Discussion
This article provides general conditions for the viability of Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) based on a
general setting of negative externality (via a general congestion function) that can model a wide
range of digital services. There are two separate messages here, both of which can be intuitively
stated. The first one says that ones service either prefers multiplexing (having more people share
proportionally more capacity) or not; if one wants to guarantee a gain (in terms of profit or social
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welfare) by dividing ones service into multiple classes with the same price, then this service would
better not prefer multiplexing. The second message says that, if one starts with a multiclass service
with the same price and one wants to move to charging different prices, then the service classes one
sets up would better generate a monotone linear preference perceived by the users. By combining
these two rules together, we can characterize a large class of services that can benefit from PMP.
These observations also help us understand why sometimes PMP is not viable. Our results help
clarify the confusion caused by conflicting results on the viability of PMP by previous studies. Our
model is general and the results are rigorously proved and applicable to future studies on network
economics.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof for Theorem 4.1
Proof. First, by Eqn. (6) in Definition 3.1, considering a single service class, we obtain
p = V − θ˜ ·K(Q˜, C) ⇒ θ˜ = V − p
K
(
Q˜, C
) (32)
where θ˜ is the cut-off user for a single service class. When there are two service classes after resource
partitioning, we obtain {
p− p =θ2 ·
(
K
(
Q2, C2
)−K(Q1, C1))
p =V − θ1 ·K
(
Q1, C1
) (33)
Hence due to Eqn. (33) it follows that
K
(
Q2, C2
)
= K
(
Q1, C1
)
(34)
θ1 =
V − p
K(Q1, C1)
(35)
Using Eqns. (32) and (35), we obtain the following equality.
θ˜
θ1
=
K(Q1, C1)
K(Q˜, C)
=
K(Q2, C2)
K(Q˜, C)
(36)
To complete the proof, we proceed in two steps as follows.
Step 1: Then, we want to show:
1. If K(Q,C) ≥ K(αQ,αC) for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then θ1 ≥ θ˜
2. If K(Q,C) ≤ K(αQ,αC) for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, then θ1 ≤ θ˜
Without loss of generality, we assume C1 ≥ C2. Let β , C1C , and hence we have β ≥ 1 − β (i.e.,
1 ≥ 1−ββ ).
First, we consider partition-preferred congestion function K(Q,C) ≥ K(αQ,αC) for all 0 ≤ α ≤
1. By Eqn. (34), it follows that
K(Q2, C2) = K(Q1, C1) ≥ K(1− β
β
Q1, C2) (37)
Because K(Q,C) is increasing in Q, we obtain
Q2 ≥ 1− β
β
Q1 ⇒ Q1 +Q2 ≥ Q1
β
(38)
Because K(Q,C) ≥ K(αQ,αC) for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, we obtain
K(Q˜, C) ≥ K(βQ˜, βC) = K(βQ˜, C1) (39)
We next use contradiction to show that θ1 ≥ θ˜. On the contrary, we suppose θ˜ > θ1. Then, by
Eqns. (36) and (39), we obtain
K
(
Q1, C1
)
> K
(
Q˜, C
) ≥ K(βQ˜, C1) (40)
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Hence, Q1 > βQ˜ because K(Q,C) is increasing in Q. Also, we note that
θ˜ > θ1 ⇒ F (θ˜) > F (θ1) ⇒ Q˜ > Q1 +Q2 (41)
Therefore we derive
Q1 > βQ˜ > β(Q1 +Q2) (42)
which is a contradiction to Eqn. (38). Hence it should be θ1 ≥ θ˜.
For multiplexing, to show that K(Q,C) ≤ K(αQ,αC) for all α implies θ1 ≤ θ˜, we note that we
can reverse the signs “≥” and “>” in Eqns (37)-(42) to “≤” and “<” respectively.
Step 2: Next, we want to show:
1. if θ1 ≥ θ˜, then S(p, p) ≥ S(p) and pi(p, p) ≥ pi(p); and
2. if θ1 ≤ θ˜, then S(p, p) ≥ S(p) and pi(p, p) ≤ pi(p).
The case of provider profit pi(p, p) and pi(p) follows from Eqns. (10) and (13) and
θ1 ≥ θ˜ ⇒ Q1 +Q2 ≥ Q˜ ⇒ pi(p, p) ≥ pi(p) (43)
θ1 ≤ θ˜ ⇒ Q1 +Q2 ≤ Q˜ ⇒ pi(p, p) ≤ pi(p) (44)
where the service classes are charged at an identical price.
For the case of social welfare S(p, p) and S(p), by Eqn. (34), we obtain
S(p, p) =
∫ θ1
0
(
V − θ ·K(Q2, C2)
)
· f(θ)dθ (45)
From Eqn. (36), we obtain
θ1 ≥ θ˜ ⇒ K
(
Q˜, C
) ≥ K(Q2, C2) ⇒ S(p, p) ≥ S(p) (46)
θ1 ≤ θ˜ ⇒ K
(
Q˜, C
) ≤ K(Q2, C2) ⇒ S(p, p) ≤ S(p) (47)
which follows from Eqns. (11) and (44)-(47).
7.2 An Overview of Total Derivative
Before we proceed to the proof of Theorem 4.4, we briefly revisit the notion of total derivative [9]
that will be useful in the following proofs.
The marginal change of real function f(x, y, z) (i.e., derivative df) with respect to parameters
x, y, z can be written as
df =
∂f
∂x
dx+
∂f
∂y
dy +
∂f
∂z
dz (48)
where ∂f∂x ,
∂f
∂y ,
∂f
∂z are the partial derivatives of f at the respective parameter while keeping other
parameters as constants. Note that ∂f∂x ,
∂f
∂y ,
∂f
∂z are also functions of x, y, z.
The derivative df can be regarded as a function of (dx, dy, dz), each of them representing the
marginal change of parameters x, y, z. Also, (dx, dy, dz) can be regarded as a vector in the 3D
Euclidean space. An immediate consequence is that if function f is a stationary point at some
(x0, y0, z0) (e.g., the maximum), then df = 0 at (x0, y0, z0) irrespective of what values of (dx, dy, dz)
we pick. Otherwise, we will be possible to pick a vector (dx, dy, dz), such that df 6= 0 implying that
f is not a stationary point at (x0, y0, z0).
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7.3 Proof for Theorem 4.4
Proof. First, we write S = S(p1, p2). We study how the total derivative of S (see Sec. 7.2), dS,
changes at p1 = p2. From Eqn. (12),
S = V · F (θ1)−K(Q2, C2)
∫ θ2
0
θ · f(θ)dθ −K(Q1, C1)
∫ θ1
θ2
θ · f(θ)dθ (49)
Recall that k(Qi, Ci) , ∂K(Q,C)∂Q |Q=Qi,C=Ci , Q2 , F (θ2) and Q1 , F (θ1)− F (θ2).
Note that an equilibrium can be characterized by tuple (p1, p2), a pair of independent variables.
Similarly, an equilibrium can also be equivalently characterized by tuple (θ1, θ2), by solving Eqn. (6)
in Definition 3.1. Then (θ1, θ2) are treated as a pair of independent variables. Thus, we take the
total derivative of S with respect to (dθ1, dθ2), and obtain the following:
dS =
V · f(θ1)dθ1 −
(∫ θ2
0
θ · f(θ)dθ
)
· k(Q2, C2)f(θ2)dθ2 −K(Q2, C2) · θ2 · f(θ2)dθ2
−
(∫ θ1
θ2
θ · f(θ)dθ
)
· k(Q1, C1)
(
f(θ1)dθ1 − f(θ2)dθ2
)
−K(Q1, C1) ·
(
θ1 · f(θ1)dθ1 − θ2 · f(θ2)dθ2
)
(50)
Then, at identical pricing p1 = p2, we have K(Q1, C1) = K(Q2, C2). Hence, we obtain
dS|p1=p2 =
V · f(θ1)dθ1 −
(∫ θ2
0
θ · f(θ)dθ
)
· k(Q2, C2)f(θ2)dθ2
−
( ∫ θ1
θ2
θ · f(θ)dθ
)
· k(Q1, C1)
(
f(θ1)dθ1 − f(θ2)dθ2
)
−K(Q1, C1) · θ1 · f(θ1)dθ1
(51)
Next, we pick a vector (dθ1, dθ2), and show that dS|p1=p2 will strictly increase in the direction of
(dθ1, dθ2). Such a vector indeed exists if we keep θ1 as a constant (i.e., dθ1 = 0).
First, we obtain
dS|p1=p2,dθ1=0 (52a)
=
((∫ θ1
θ2
θ · f(θ)dθ
)
· k(Q1, C1)−
(∫ θ2
0
θ · f(θ)dθ
)
· k(Q2, C2)
)
f(θ2)dθ2
> θ2 ·
((∫ θ1
θ2
f(θ)dθ
)
· k(Q1, C1)−
(∫ θ2
0
f(θ)dθ
)
· k(Q2, C2)
)
f(θ2)dθ2
= θ2
(
Q1 · k(Q1, C1)−Q2 · k(Q2, C2)
)
f(θ2)dθ2 (52b)
Without loss of generality, we assume Q1 ≥ Q2. Since the two service classes satisfy monotone
preference (Definition 4.3), if we always pick dθ2 > 0 in the case of (m.1), and dθ2 < 0 in the case
of (m.2), then it is always true that the total derivative dS|p1=p2,dθ1=0 > 0. Therefore, we see that
the social welfare S can strictly increase by differentiated pricing (p1 6= p2) from identical pricing
(p1 = p2).
7.4 Proof for Corollary 4.5
Proof. By Theorem 4.4, it is true for m = 2. For m = 3, it follows that p1 = p2 = p3 cannot be
optimal. Next, we also show that p1 > p2 = p3 and p1 = p2 > p3 cannot be optimal. Then, the total
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derivative of social welfare S with three service classes becomes
dS =
V · f(θ1)dθ1 −
(∫ θ3
0
θ · f(θ)dθ
)
· k(Q3, C3)f(θ3)dθ3 −K(Q3, C3) · θ3 · f(θ3)dθ3
−
(∫ θ2
θ3
θ · f(θ)dθ
)
· k(Q2, C2)
(
f(θ2)dθ2 − f(θ3)dθ3
)
−K(Q2, C2) ·
(
θ2 · f(θ2)dθ2 − θ3 · f(θ3)dθ3
)
−
(∫ θ1
θ2
θ · f(θ)dθ
)
· k(Q1, C1)
(
f(θ1)dθ1 − f(θ2)dθ2
)
−K(Q1, C1) ·
(
θ1 · f(θ1)dθ1 − θ2 · f(θ2)dθ2
)
(53)
For p1 > p2 = p3 (i.e., K(Q2, C2) = K(Q3, C3)), setting dθ1 = dθ2 = 0 will degenerate to the case
m = 2. For p1 = p2 > p3 (i.e., K(Q1, C1) = K(Q2, C2)), setting dθ1 = dθ3 = 0 will also degenerate
to the case m = 2. Hence, it follows for m = 3 is true. Using an iterative argument, we can show
that it is true for all m ≥ 2.
7.5 Proof for Theorem 4.6
Proof. Similar to Theorem 4.4, taking the total derivative of pi with respect to (dp1, dp2), we have
dpi = Q2dp2 + p2 · f(θ2)
(
∂θ2
∂p1
dp1 +
∂θ2
∂p2
dp2
)
+Q1dp1
+p1 ·
(
f(θ1)
(
∂θ1
∂p1
dp1 +
∂θ1
∂p2
dp2
)
− f(θ2)
(
∂θ2
∂p1
dp1 +
∂θ2
∂p2
dp2
)) (54)
Then, at identical pricing (p1 = p2), we obtain
dpi|p2=p1 = Q2dp2 +Q1dp1 + p1 · f(θ1)(
∂θ1
∂p1
dp1 +
∂θ1
∂p2
dp2) (55)
However, dpi is more difficult than dS, involving ∂θ1∂p1 and
∂θ1
∂p2
.
As in Theorem 4.4, we pick a vector (dp1, dp2), and show that dpi|p1=p2 will strictly increase in
the direction of (dp1, dp2). To achieve this we keep θ1 as a constant (i.e., dθ1 =
∂θ1
∂p1
dp1+
∂θ1
∂p2
dp2 = 0).
Hence
dpi|p1=p2,dθ1=0 = Q1dp1 +Q2dp2 (56)
Also, from Eqn. (6) in Definition 3.1, we obtain the total derivatives (p1, p2) with respect to (dp1, dp2)
as 
dp1 = −K(Q1, C1)dθ1 − θ1 · k(Q1, C1)(f(θ1)dθ1 − f(θ2)dθ2)
dp1 − dp2 = (K(Q2, C2)−K(Q1, C1))dθ2
+θ2 ·
(
k(Q2, C2)(f(θ2)dθ2)− k(Q1, C1)(f(θ1)dθ1 − f(θ2)dθ2)
) (57)
We keep θ1 as a constant (i.e., dθ1 = 0), and by identical pricing p1 = p2 ⇒ K(Q1, C1) = K(Q2, C2),
we have {
dp1 = θ1 · k(Q1, C1)f(θ2)dθ2
dp1 − dp2 = θ2 ·
(
k(Q2, C2) + k(Q1, C1)
)
· f(θ2)dθ2 (58)
Solving Eqn. (58) for (dp1, dp2), we obtain
dp2 =
−θ2 · (k(Q2, C2) + k(Q1, C1)) + θ1 · k(Q1, C1)
θ1 · k(Q1, C1) dp1 (59)
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Because keeping θ1 as a constant (i.e., dθ1 = 0), by substituting Eqn. (59) we obtain
dpi|p1=p2,dθ1=0 = Q2dp2 +Q1dp1 (60a)
=
(
Q2 ·
(− θ2 · (k(Q2, C2) + k(Q1, C1)) + θ1 · k(Q1, C1))+Q1θ1 · k(Q1, C1)) dp1
θ1 · k(Q1, C1)
=
(−Q2θ2 · (k(Q2, C2)
k(Q1, C1)
)−Q2θ2 +Q2θ1 +Q1θ1
)dp1
θ1
(60b)
>
(−Q2 · (k(Q2, C2)
k(Q1, C1)
)−Q2 +Q2 +Q1
)θ2dp1
θ1
(60c)
=
(
Q1 · k(Q1, C1)−Q2 · k(Q2, C2)
) θ2dp1
θ1 · k(Q1, C1) (60d)
Without loss of generality, we assume Q1 > Q2. Since the two service classes satisfy monotone
preference (Definition 4.3), if we always pick dθ2 > 0 in the case of (m.1) and dθ2 < 0 in the case
of (m.2), then it is always true that dpi|p1=p2,dθ1=0 > 0. Therefore, the provider profit pi can strictly
increase by differentiated pricing (p1 6= p2) from identical pricing (p1 = p2).
7.6 Derivatives of dpi
I
dpI
Table 2: Derivatives of all cases of dpi
I
dpI
.
Cases dpi
I
dpI
pI ≥ pII1 ≥ pII2 1k1θ1
(
− pI + k1Q1θ1
+ K1p
I(−k2k3θ2θ3+k1θ1(K2−K3−2k3θ3)+(K1−K2−2k2θ2)(K2−K3−2k3θ3))
k1k2θ1θ2(K2−K3−2k3θ3)−(K1+k1θ1)(k2k3θ2θ3−(K1−K2−2k2θ2)(K2−K3−2k3θ3))
)
pII1 ≥ pI ≥ pII2 Q2 + p
I
K2−K3−2k3θ3
− pI(K1+k1θ1)(K2−K3+k2θ2−2k3θ3)(−K2+K3+k3θ3)(−K2+K3+2k3θ3)(k2k3(K1+k1θ1)θ2θ3+(−k1k2θ1θ2−(K1+k1θ1)(K1−K2−2k2θ2))(K2−K3−2k3θ3))
pII1 ≥ pII2 ≥ pI Q3 + p
I
K2−K3−2k3θ3
+ k2k3p
I(K1+k1θ1)θ2θ3
(−K2+K3+2k3θ3)(k2k3(K1+k1θ1)θ2θ3+(−(K1−K2)(K1+k1θ1)+k2(2K1+k1θ1)θ2)(K2−K3−2k3θ3))
pI ≥ pII K12Q1+K2(pI−Q1(K1+k1θ1))+k2(pI−k1Q1θ1)θ2+K1Q1(k1θ1−2k2θ2)
K1
2−k1θ1(K2+k2θ2)−K1(K2−k1θ1+2k2θ2)
pII ≥ pI Q2 − p
I(K1+k1θ1)
−k1k2θ1θ2−(K1+k1θ1)(K1−K2−2k2θ2)
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